Abstract

The aim of the article is not to test the soundness of the reasons put forward in support of the so-called resolute reading of the Tractatus. Rather, the article focuses on some of the most significant consequences of that reading, on its pars construens, so to speak. Some of the arguments developed by the New Wittgenstein concerning the way in which the delimitation between sense and nonsense can be traced, once the principles of the pictorial theory of language have been recognized as plain nonsense, gibberish, and, accordingly, have been «thrown away», are critically scrutinized. The examination leads to the following main conclusions: a) the philosophical style of some of the most authoritative representatives of the New Wittgenstein, beyond its greater or lesser rhetorical effectiveness, leaves much to be desired as regards logical rigor and clarity; b) as a consequence, the results achieved by the New Wittgenstein on the themes dealt with in the article are, on the whole, rather modest.