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(doi: 10.2383/85291)

Sociologica (ISSN 1971-8853)

Fascicolo 2, maggio-agosto 2016

Ente di afferenza:

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Women in the Field of Power

by Johannes Hjellbrekke *and* Olav Korsnes

doi: 10.2383/85291

1. Women in the Field of Power

In the autumn of 2015, the largest Norwegian telecom company, Telenor, appointed Sigve Brekke as its new CEO. Brekke, the son of a Labour party politician and himself a former state secretary for Labour in the Ministry of Defence in 1995-1996, converted his political capital into economic capital in 1999, when he became CEO of Telenor's Singapore branch. Telenor's leader of the board, Svein Aaser, would soon be strongly criticized for choosing Brekke. Female candidates had not been shortlisted or considered as serious contenders for the top position. In this way, Telenor, a company controlled by the Norwegian state, continued a long tradition of practically excluding women from managerial positions in both public and private business.

In October 2015, Aaser had to hand in his resignation. Representing 54% of the shares in Telenor, the female Minister of Commerce, Monica Meland, made it clear that because of issues involving corruption in Uzbekistan, Aaser no longer had her confidence. When Gunn Wærsted as the first woman ever was appointed the new leader of the board, her message to Brekke would soon be clear: the company needs more women in leading positions.

Even though Norway is regarded as one of the most egalitarian societies in the world, and even though gender equality is considered a hallmark of the Scandinavian welfare states, recruitment to elite positions in business remains strongly skewed along gender lines. New legislation was introduced in 2003, demanding minimum

40% women at the boards of shareholder companies, but in the managerial staff, women are still in minority. Based on data from 2013, Statistics Norway concluded that only 1 in 3, or 35%, of managerial positions are held by women. According to the ILO (International Labour Organization), Norway in this respect ranks well below the United States, France and Russia [ILO report: *Women in Business and Management* 2015].

The Telenor case mirrors structural oppositions in the Norwegian field of power. Whereas positions in politics and higher civil service at least since the 1980s have been relatively open to women, as e.g. Monica Meland, managerial positions in both private and public business have remain far more difficult to access. Wærsted, the leader of the board, is one of only a handful women that over time have held leading positions in Norwegian private business and finance. The capital structures in the Norwegian field of power are therefore also gendered structures. Some sectors of the field are more open to women than others, but the trajectories leading to the field positions vary, also between women. An analysis of the recruitment of women to positions in the field of power must therefore not only focus on differences *between* men and women, but also on the internal differences *among* women. Inspired by the late Pierre Bourdieu's theory of the field of power, and based on our previous analyses [Hjellbrekke *et al.* 2007; Hjellbrekke and Korsnes 2009 and 2014; Denord *et al.* 2011], the main ambition in this article is therefore to examine the oppositions internally among the women in the Norwegian field of power.

We ask three main questions:

a) How is the overall distribution of the *various forms of capital* in the subgroup of women related to the global space of *élite* positions? In what ways do the capital structures among *élite* women differ from the capital structures describing the global *élite*?

b) Social capital assets or network connections are generally of high importance in the field of power. How is the distribution of *social capital* assets among the *élite* women as compared to the overall distribution in the global space?

c) Are the women in the field of power a homogenous or heterogenous group of individuals? How many *subgroups* can be identified among the women in field of power, and what are their main characteristics?

We will address these questions in three steps. First, we construct a field of power in Bourdieu's terminology. Secondly, we compare the capital structures of the female within this space with the structures in the global space. Thirdly, we identify clusters of *élite* women in the field of power. The data stem from the Leadership survey [Gulbrandsen *et al.* 2002], and the statistical analysis is done by way of Multiple

Correspondence Analysis (MCA), Class Specific MCA and ascending hierarchical cluster analysis [Le Roux and Rouanet 2010; Le Roux 2014].

2. Societal Perceptions, Patterns of Élite Recruitment and Gender Inequality

The perceptions of social hierarchies and the centrality of an élite have proven to vary strongly between countries in what Esping-Andersen [1990] has coined “Welfare Capitalism.” This can also clearly be seen from the distributions in Table 1, where France and Italy stand out with the least, and Norway with the most “egalitarian” respondents:

TAB. 1 *Varieties in Societal Perceptions. Weighted Distributions.*

	France	Italy	Germany	Norway	Sweden	UK	USA
An élite at the top, few in the middle, many at the bottom	18.1	33.7	18.8	2.1	7.1	13.9	16.6
A society that looks like a pyramid, with an élite at the top, more in the middle, and most at the bottom	50.7	40.9	35.4	10.8	23.3	41.8	39.6
A pyramid, but with few people at the bottom.	17.1	12.3	23.0	23.6	29.8	18.8	14.5
A society where most people are in the middle.	12.4	11.2	18.6	56.4	37.9	21.9	26.5
Many people near the top, only very few at the bottom	1.7	1.9	4.2	7.1	1.9	3.5	2.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2009: Social Inequality IV.

The response profiles for the US and the UK display a strong similarity, whereas Sweden is in more of an intermediary position; egalitarian perceptions are strong, but 1 in 3 Swedes still perceive their society as one where the élite is at the top of a clear hierarchy.

The reasons for the above observed differences are multiple, both in a historical and in a contemporary context. The power of the élites, and also their symbolic

expressions, has varied. The capitalist class in Sweden has for instance been stronger than in Norway, and both Sweden and the UK, unlike Norway and the USA, have had a nobility. As Michael Hartmann's numerous studies show, the recruitment to elite positions also vary between countries [2006 and 2007]. In Europe, Hartmann describes three main models, based on the individuals' social backgrounds, their educational trajectories and the level of professional circulation between various sectors:

a) An English model, with a narrow social selection, a few select elite educational institutions ("Oxbridge" or Sandhurst military academy) and a limited degree of professional sectorial circulation.

b) A French model, with a narrow social selection, a few select elite educational institutions ("Grandes écoles") and higher degree of professional sectorial circulation ("pantouflage").

c) A German model, with a broader social selection, no elite educational institutions and a limited degree of sectorial circulation.

Hartmann does not deal expressively with the gendered recruitment patterns, but the respondents' general perceptions about gender differences in mobility chances display a stronger between-country similarity:

TAB. 2 Respondent's Country by "Getting Ahead: How Important is Being Born a Man or Woman?"

	France	Italy	Germany	Norway	Sweden	UK	USA
Essential	2.6	4.6	2.6	1.2	1.8	2.1	1.5
Very important	6.0	14.5	11.6	5.3	8.3	5.7	8.4
Fairly important	16.6	23.5	21.5	25.0	23.5	12.4	15.8
Not very important	21.7	27.6	30.2	42.6	33.7	30.0	35.9
Not important at all	53.1	29.8	34.1	26.0	32.7	49.3	38.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	n=2625	n=971	n=1329	n=1377	n=1054	n=890	n=1517

Source: International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2009: Social Inequality IV.

In Table 2, more than 65% of the respondents in all countries answer that gender is "Not very important" or "Not important at all" for getting ahead. If taken literally, a majority of the respondents are seemingly not inclined to relate career inequalities to gender inequalities. In the popular perception, where one ends up in the social hierarchy thus depends less on gender than on other factors. Even so, the above studies show that even in Norway, real gender differences exist in the recruitment patterns to the elite positions, and gender *inequality* has been a persistent and dominant characteristic of the egalitarian Norwegian society.

3. Data, Variables and Methods

In the Leadership Survey 2000-2001, conducted by the Norwegian Power and Democracy Project, 1710 individuals were identified based on institutional and positional criteria [Gulbrandsen *et al.* 2002]. The data are now 15 years old, but the survey is still able to give a valid and precise description of élite structures in Norway. With a response rate of 87.3%, it is still also by far the best data set available to us on the Norwegian élites. In this article, we have only had access to the anonymized version of this data set. Even so, for analytical purposes, the results are analogue to those found in Hjellbrekke *et al.* [2007], where we had access to even more precise information on the individuals. We have retained 30 active variables for the construction of the global field of power:

TAB. 3 *Active Variables in the Analysis, Organized in Five Main Groups. 30 Variables, 75 Active Categories, 10 Passive Categories.*

Economic Capital		Cultural/Educational Capital, Personal and Inherited	
Personal income: 3 categories (-25%, 26-74%, 75%+)		Father's educational level: 5 categories	
Income on savings, shares etc.: (-25%, 26-74%, 75%+, Negative)		Partners's educational level: 5 categories	
Registered property: (-25%, 26-74%, 75%+)		Own educational level: 5 categories	
		Studies abroad: (1 yr, 2yrs+, No)	
		Worked abroad: (Yes/no)	
Personal Social Capital (Coded yes/no)		Inherited Social Capital (Coded yes/no)	
Board member, private company		Father/mother, board member, private/public company.	
Board member, general assembly		Father/mother, board member, managerial organization	
Board member, election committee		Father/mother, board member, trade union	
Board member, public company		Father/mother, board member, Voluntary organization	
Board member, managerial organization		Father/mother, Member of parliament	
Board member, trade union			
Board member, voluntary organization			
Professional Experience/Field Trajectories (Coded yes/no)			
Civil service		Defense	
Research		Organisations (including NGOs)	
Politics		Church	
Justice		Media	
Business		Culture	

Source: Authors' Elaboration

These are first subjected to a Specific Multiple Correspondence Analysis (hereafter MCA) [Le Roux 2014; Le Roux and Rouanet 2010]. MCA finds a geometrical representation of the structures of a table or a matrix. The chi-square distances between the row/column categories are calculated, the oppositions between row or column profiles maximised, and the latent structures or axes that best describe the oppositions between row or column profiles in the table are uncovered. Axis 1 describes the most dominant opposition, axis 2 the second most dominant etc. Each axis constitutes a dimension in a multi-dimensional *space*, and each row/column point (i.e. individual or category) can be located as a *point* within this space. Variables included in the construction of the space are *active* variables, and variables that are projected into this solution are *illustrative* or *supplementary* variables. The interpretation is based on two *clouds of points* – the cloud of individuals and the cloud of categories.

The clouds are usually projected onto *factorial plane* 1-2, 1-3, 2-3 etc. Each point's position must be interpreted relative or in relation to the positions of all the other points belonging to the same cloud. Categories with similar response profiles, i.e. that “share” the same set of individuals, are located in proximity to each other, and categories with differing profiles distant from each other. The *eigenvalue* is the part of the variance in the cloud projected onto a given axis. The amount of *inertia* or variance “explained” by an axis is equal to its eigenvalue divided by the total inertia in the cloud, and is given as a percentage. The *contribution* from a given category/variable to a given axis is an indicator of the category's/variable's importance to the construction of a main opposition in the data. Categories and variables with high contributions (contributions >mean contribution) are emphasized in the interpretation.

4. Structures in the Global Field of Power

In Bourdieu's more general theory of the social space, the notion of the field of power holds a particular importance. It not only indicates the regions of social space where capital concentration is at its strongest, but also a space where agents located in dominant positions in several fields are engaged in struggles that affect power relations within and between the different fields [Bourdieu 1989; Bourdieu and de St. Martin 1978]. To construct this field means first to uncover its latent capital structures, to analyse its relations to the structures in the global social space, and then to identify the field positions' location *within* this multidimensional structure of oppositions. This will also be the global field within which oppositions between *the women* in the field of power can be examined.

In the case of Norway, a specific MCA of the capital indicators listed in Table 3 reveals four main dimensions in the Norwegian field of power, of which three can be interpreted as general axes. These sum up 73.3% of the modified rate of inertia:¹

TAB. 4 *Variance of Axes, Modified Rates and Cumulated Rates.*

	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
Variance of axis (eigenvalues)	.1077	.0832	.0665
Modified rates	42.9	19.9	10.5
Cumulated modified rates	42.9	62.8	73.3

Source: Authors' Elaboration.

The contributions from the six blocks of variables to axes 1-3 is shown in Table 5:

TAB. 5 *Contributions from Blocks of Variables to Axes 1-3.*

	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
Economic Capital	37.0	1.9	12.0
Personal Educational Capital	3.4	20.9	16.9
Inherited and Family Related Capital	2.7	26.9	2.2
Personal Social Capital	31.4	8.8	17.1
Inherited Social Capital	9.8	39.4	17.7
Professional Trajectory	15.7	2.1	34.1
Total	100	100	100

Source: Authors' Elaboration.

If we sum up the distributions in Table 4.2, axes 1-3 can be interpreted as follows:

Axis 1 is first and foremost an economic capital axis, separating lower volumes from higher volumes of economic capital assets. The axis is also especially related to the business linked inherited social capital.

¹ See Hjellbrekke *et al.* [2007] and Hjellbrekke and Korsnes [2009] for a detailed interpretation and a general overview of the field's history.

Axis 2, on the other hand, is mainly an axis of field seniority; it opposes high and low volumes of inherited social capital and of inherited (and personal) educational capital. As such, the axis is therefore a social mobility axis, opposing “newcomers” and “inheritors” [Hjellbrekke and Korsnes 2013].

Receiving high contributions from the block on professional trajectories, a more detailed inspection reveals that axis 3 opposes social capital assets with experience in organizations, trade union, media and politics (linked to lower level of education) to economic capital with experience in justice (linked to higher level of education).

In Figures 1 and 2, the ten sectors from which respondents are selected are projected on to factorial planes 1-2 and 2-3 within this space of capitals:




FIG. 1. Sectors in Factorial Plane 1-2. Specific MCA.

Note: (Global Space)

Source: Authors' elaboration.

A tri-polar structure is revealed in factorial plane 1-2, opposing positions in business from all the other positions along axis 1, and positions in politics from positions in research along axis 2.




FIG. 2. Sectors in Factorial Plane 2-3. Specific MCA.

Note: (Global Space. Axis 2 as horizontal axis and axis 3 as vertical axis).

Source: Authors' elaboration.

Axis three (vertical axis in Figure 2) describes an opposition between positions in politics, NGOs and organisations and in culture from military and judicial positions.² Unlike in some other countries, e.g. the US, political and judicial careers are thus almost mutually excluding in Norway.

Finally, an inspection of the global cloud of individuals (not shown) reveals that the global space is also a gendered system of oppositions. Men are evenly distributed in the factorial planes, and their structural oppositions follow closely the structures in the global space. Women, however, are systematically located to the left on axis 1, the economic capital axis, but more evenly distributed on both sides of axes 2 and 3. Against this background, when the chairman and the board of Telenor was criticized for not having considered women for the top job, they were therefore criticized for practicing what we might call “sectorial inbreeding;” in a sector strongly dominated by men, they appointed an insider with high volumes of both economic and political capital. In this way, the gap between business and politics could be bridged by a field specific type of *social capital* that has been of central importance in parts of Norwegian business: political capital. Women in the field of power might

² For further details and for the full set of 45 positions, see Hjellbrekke *et al.* [2007].

have one of these types of capital, but to find women who combine them is still rather rare.

5. Gender and Social Capital

As pointed out by Ronald Burt [2005], a network position might give exclusive access to information, and result in control over its further diffusion. Social capital can thus have an inherent capacity for mediation, coordination and control over the flow of information between the various sectors, positions and networks in the field of power. Within this structured space of capitals, the distribution of the various forms of social capital can therefore be of central importance, and the results in Denord *et al.* [2011] indicate that inequalities with respect to social capital are not strongly correlated with axis 1 in the global field (see Figure 1), i.e. the economic capital axis, but to axes 2 and 3 (Figure 2).

The literature on social capital is wide [Fine 2000; Field 2003; Ponthieux 2006], and currently, there are at least three dominating research traditions:

a) The social integration approach first conceptualized by Coleman [1988 and 1990] and later further developed by Putnam [1993 and 2000], where the latter's main emphasis is clearly on the positive societal effects of social capital.

b) The network approach, as conceptualized by Lin [2001] and also by Burt [2005], where social networks and the resources they give access to are seen as a source for power and also for social inequality.

c) The bourdieusian approach, with a strong emphasis on both contemporary and historically established networks of recognition, and where the necessity of analysing the relations between social capital and the other forms of capital in an analysis of power relations, social inequality, group and class formation [Bourdieu 1980; 1986; 1987; 1991]³.

Because of its emphasis on the historical and institutional dimension, on the centrality of agents' reciprocal recognition and because social capital can be analysed as both an individual and a collective asset, for instance in an analysis of gender inequality, we favour the bourdieusian approach over the two others.

Following Bourdieu's discussion of the various states of cultural capital, we can separate between inherited, objectified and institutionalised states of social capital

³ Most of the texts in the book *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge: Polity Press [1991]) were published in *Ce que parler veut dire: l'économie des échanges linguistiques* (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard [1982]), but two of the essays in the original publication are left out, and five other original French texts from various sources are added; see preface pp. vii-ix.

[Denord *et al.* 2011]; in its inherited state, social capital can be operationalised as board, group and/or network memberships that are mediated through one's family of origin; in its objectified state, as personal memberships in prestigious clubs and associations, board memberships and exclusive and excluding networks; in its institutionalised state as the formalized and regular contact patterns that stem from holding a formal position in political parties, governmental bodies, private and public companies, NGOs, etc.

Along all three sub-dimensions of social capital, it is possible to separate between “the have” and “the have nots” within the field. But to what degree is this also a gendered division? Are we literally talking of an “old boys network,” consisting of a group of men with high volumes of inherited social capital? Are women more or less excluded from “the inner circles” of the field of power [Useem 1984]? Or is this a hierarchy that also separates between “have” and “have nots” among the women in the field?

When addressing these questions, we have to rely on information on the contact patterns between the various positions and sectors. The contacts can be of both informal and formal character. *Informal contacts* will most often depend more on an individual's personal trajectory than on his or her positions. Not having reliable information on the level and the degree of informal contacts between the full set of sectors, the number of sectors an individual has worked in will serve as a proxy for an individual's potential to draw on more informal contacts when manoeuvring in the field of power.

Formal contacts, however, depend more on the institutionalised relations between the field positions. Politicians meet formally and regularly not only with other politicians, but also with leaders in most, if not all the other sectors. A given individual's level and range of formal contacts might therefore serve as an indicator of the individual's capacity for mediation and coordination in the field. Measured by the level and the range of formalised and regular contacts with other positions in the field of power, this will also be an indicator of the given individual's volume and composition of institutionalised social capital (hereafter ISC).

A first indicator of any systematic inequality between men and women can be measured by the degree of closure, or relative isolation, in the field. In what sectors are the “endogamous” individuals – defined as individuals who only have formalized contacts with people from their own sector – to be found? Are there more “endogamous” women than men, or are we rather witnessing strong gender-internal inequalities? Is the level of multipositionality [Boltanski 1973], measured by the number of individuals with many contacts to other sectors, unevenly distributed between men and women? Whereas “endogamous” individuals might exert “local” power within

their respective sector, multipositional individuals have a higher potential for mobilizing a wider set of resources, and thus also a capacity for exerting “global” power.

The results in Table 6 show the degree of closure for men and women in their respective sectors. The general tendency in the table seems clear: not only do most leaders or position holders meet regularly with people in similar positions in other sectors. The difference between men and women is also not the greatest:

TABLE 6 *Degree of Closure in the Field of Power.*

Sector	Men			Women		
	«Endogamous»	All	Degree of closure	«Endogamous»	All	Degree of closure
Church	31	99	.31	3	8	.37
Civil Service	13	159	.08	4	38	.11
Culture	33	98	.34	14	45	.31
Media	7	96	.07	6	20	.30
Business	83	372	.22	3	18	.17
Organisations	11	164	.07	9	51	.18
Research	22	123	.18	5	28	.18
Police	8	68	.12	9	15	.60
Politics	4	112	.04	5	78	.06
Total	212	1291	.16	58	301	.19

Note: (Formalized contacts) Male and female respondents.

Source: Authors' Elaboration.

The degree of closure stands at .16 among men and at .19 among women. There are, however, sectorial exceptions to the rule: women in the police/judicial sector, in the media, in organizations and in the church tend to be more “endogamous,” and thus more isolated, than their male colleagues. The largest deviation is found within the police and the judicial sector, but with only 12 and 15 women in these two sectors, these gender differences should be interpreted with certain caution. The deviation between men and women in media and in organizations is more striking. In these cases, men are clearly more often in intermediary positions than women. Even though this cannot be directly inferred from these numbers, we therefore find it likely that the multipositional men in these sectors are in a stronger position to exert “global” power in the field, whereas the power of their unipositional female counterparts is more “local,” and thus also more restricted, with a weaker potential for drawing on external resources also in “internal” struggles. Exclusion from formal meetings might be compensated by working through informal contacts and networks. The

number of sectors an individual has worked serves both as an indicator of the extent of an individual's network, of field seniority and also of the potential for mobilizing resources through such informal contacts. Table 7 shows how many sectors men and the women in the field of power have been working in throughout their career:

TAB. 7 *Sectors Worked in (Level of "Pantouflage"). Male and Female Respondents.*

	Men	Women
1 sector	32%	30%
2 sectors	37%	38%
3 sectors	21%	22%
4 sectors	7%	8%
5 sectors+	2%	2%
Total	100% (N=1409)	100 (N=301)

Source: Authors' Elaboration.

The two distributions are almost identical, and when it comes to what in France is described as "pantouflage," or circulation between positions in public and in private sector, in the case of Norway the differences between men and women are minimal. Networks based on former work experience do not *per se* separate men from women. But when broken down on the specific sectors, some interesting *internal* differences among the women appear:

TAB. 8 *Sectors Worked in (Level of "Pantouflage"). Female Respondents.*

Sectors worked in	Church	Civil Service	Culture	Media	Business	Organisations	Research	Police/ Justice	Politics
1 sector	25	24	29	60	39	12	50	27	29
2 sectors	75	42	33	35	28	55	21	40	32
3 sectors+	0	34	38	5	33	33	29	33	39
Total	100 (n=8)	100 (n=38)	100 (n=45)	100 (n=20)	100 (n=18)	100 (n=51)	100 (n=28)	100 (n=15)	100 (n=78)

Source: Authors' Elaboration.

In most sectors, 1 in 3 women have work experience from three or more sectors, but sector-internal careers are more often found among women in the media, in research and in business. Social capital assets are therefore not evenly distributed between the various sectors, and this systematic opposition between unipositional and multipositional women may hint at more systematic inequalities between the women in the field of power. In the remainder of this article, we'll analyse these inequalities in greater detail.

6. Women in the Field of Power: Class Specific Analysis

As pointed out above, the overall majority of women are located in the two quadrants to the left in factorial plane 1-2, and only a handful to the right, where the mean points for the business positions are located. Men, on the contrary, are distributed evenly in the space. The women are thus embedded in structures mainly defined by oppositions found between the male members of the *élite*, but not in identical ways. There are structural oppositions also in the subgroup of *élite* women, and it is to these differences we now turn our attention. Given that the women are located in only a few of the sectors of the space; what are the polarizing structures among the women? In what ways do they differ from the structures in the global space? Class Specific Analysis (hereafter CSA) is a technique that is particularly suited for addressing these questions, and thus also to the question of how various *subfields* are related to the structures found in the global social space. Are the oppositions in the subfields mainly replications of the structures in the social space, or do we find indications of what we, following Philip S. Gorski, might call varying degrees of heteronomy, i.e.

the degree to which the [structuredness of positions within a given field] is influenced by other fields [Gorski 2013, 330].

As pointed out by Gorski [*Ibidem*], this is also linked to the question of relative field autonomy and thus of field and capital hierarchies. Over time, some forms of capital might become more or less valuable in field struggles. In some cases, as the Norwegian Telenor-case demonstrates, political capital might for instance trump economic capital, and thus refute an orthodox Marxist interpretation of the outcome of the process. And whereas Bourdieu often has been coined as a Marxist sociologist, Fabiani convincingly argues that this “illusion” originated in particular Anglo-American and in German misreadings of his work [Fabiani 2016, 117]. On the contrary, to simply assume that all other forms of capital can be derived from economic capital, or that the opposition between cultural and economic capital constitutes a universal capital composition principle, would imply a preconstruction of the research object

[Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968]. To determine the structural oppositions in a given field or a subspace, and thus the structural location of the positions, is not just a theoretical, but also an empirical question [Hjellbrekke & Korsnes 2013]. Doing a CSA is one way to analyse these questions statistically. As demonstrated by Le Roux & Rouanet [2010, 61-67], CSA searches for principal axes in a subcloud associated with a class of individuals within a global space or a global cloud. In this way, specific features of a given class or subgroup can be analysed with reference to the whole set of active individuals. The main interpretation of the results is based on the same properties as an MCA: the eigenvalues of the specific axes, and the contributions from, and the deviations between active categories. In addition, the cosines of the angles between the “old” and the “new” axes carry important information. The more similar one old and one new axis is, the closer is the cosine to ± 1 . Doing a CSA thus means doing a comparison of

- a) the dimensionality in the MCA vs in the CSA;
- b) the angles between the dimensions in the MCA and the CSA;
- c) the more detailed interpretation of the axes from the MCA vs. the axes from the CSA.

Table 9 reveals the first sets of results:

TABLE 9 *Eigenvalues from Specific MCA and from CSA.*

	Eigenvalues, Original MCA	Eigenvalues, CSA of Women
Axis 1	.1077	.1102
Axis 2	.0887	.0876
Axis 3	.0783	.0783
Axis 4	.0602	.0715
Axis 5	.0533	.0690

Source: Authors' Elaboration

Judged from the eigenvalues, the strongest opposition among the women, Axis 1, is even stronger than Axis 1 in the global space (.1102 against .1077). As in the global space, there are at least three axes to interpret, but the drop from axis 3 to axis 4 is far smaller in the CSA than in the MCA. Upon closer inspection of the more detailed results, Axis 4 is primarily describing a subgroup of unmarried women (>35% of the contribution to axis 4 stems from this category). It is thus clearly a

second order axis. And even though this particular group or category of women is sociologically interesting, the drop in the eigenvalues from axis 3 to axes 4 and 5 is a clear indication that in the CSA only 3 axes should be retained for further interpretation.

From the results in Table 10, it is clear that not only is the dimensionality in the two spaces different. The most important axes in the MCA and in the CSA are either not identical to each other, or ranked differently:

TAB. *Cosines, Axes from MCA and CSA*
10

	Axis 1 CSA	Axis 2 CSA	Axis 3 CSA
Axis 1 MCA	.1059	.3414	.0682
Axis 2 MCA	.9489	.0202	-.0155
Axis 3 MCA	-.0209	.4840	.5546
Axis 4 MCA	-.0842	-.3869	.1198

Source: Authors' Elaboration

Axis 1 in the MCA, the economic capital axis, is not at all present in the CSA. With a cosine at .9489, Axis 1 in the CSA, however, displays a strong similarity to axis 2 in the MCA, i.e. the social mobility/field seniority axis. With the economic capital axis “removed,” the social mobility dimension becomes the most important structural opposition among the women. In general, the contrast between “the inheritors” and the “newcomers” is therefore more prominent among women than among men.

With their highest cosines at .484 and .5546, and thus standing at 61 and 56 degrees on axis 3 from the MCA, the other two axes we have retained from the CSA are dimensions that are more unique for the women. The contributions from the blocks of variables are listed in Table 11:

TAB. Contributions from Blocks of Variables to Axes 1-3, CSA.
11

	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
Economic Capital	3.1	22.0	18.6
Personal Educational Capital	18.4	4.9	13.9
Inherited and Family Related Educational Capital	18.8	11.2	10.4
Personal Social Capital	6.9	14.7	7.3
Inherited Social Capital	32.6	25.6	7.7
Professional Trajectory	20.2	21.6	42.1
Total	100	100	100

Source: Authors' Elaboration

Compared to the distributions in Table 5, there are some striking differences. Firstly, the contribution from the block on economic capital is far lower to axis 1, and more evenly distributed on axes 2 and 3. If economic capital assets at all exert a polarizing capacity among women, it is most likely in combination with other capital assets, and not on their own. Secondly, in the CSA, the two blocks on inherited capital constitute a primary opposition along the most important axis, with a combined contribution of 51.4% to axis 1 (18.8 + 32.6). In the global space, the economic capital assets establish the primary opposition, but among the women, it is the inherited capital assets. Thirdly, with 42.1% of the contribution to axis 3, the variables on professional trajectory contribute more strongly to this axis than they do in the global analysis. The individual's trajectory might therefore be more prominent among women than among men.

An inspection of the cloud of categories yields important additional information on these oppositions. The categories with the highest contribution to axis 1 are shown in Figure 3:




FIG. 3. Contributions to Axis 1, CSA.

Note: F: Father; FM: Father/Mother; P; Partner; TU: Trade Union.

Source: Authors' elaboration.

Summed up, Axis 1 describes a systematic opposition between inheritors and newcomers, which is also an opposition between “the haves” and “the have nots” in terms of

- a) High and low volumes of inherited social capital (ISC), measured by the parents' board memberships at national level;
- b) High and low volumes of personal and inherited educational capital assets;
- c) Having and not having a board membership in public company, i.e. a type of personal social capital of high importance in the Norwegian political system;
- d) Having/not having worked in research, in culture and/or in NGOs.

Also, *but in the opposite direction*, the axis opposes having from not having worked in politics, suggesting that for the least capital-strong women in the Norwegian field of power, i.e. the newcomers, participation in politics may be an easier road to upward social mobility into the field. For “the haves,” the reproduction of social capital assets is strong, also among the women. Summed up, as volume axis, axis 1 is primarily separating low and high volumes cultural and inherited social and cultural capital, but not high and low volumes of economic capital.

The opposition with respect to social origin along axis one has proven to be a general opposition in the Norwegian field of power and in its various subfields, both in the political subfield and in the subfield of administration. As such, it constitutes

one of the clearest homologies between the various subfields [Hjellbrekke & Korsnes 2014]. Evidently, this opposition is not only also present among the women; it is actually *stronger* among women than among men.

The categories with highest contributions to Axis 2 are depicted in Figure 4:




FIG. 4. Contributions to Axis 2, CSA.

Note: F: Father; FM: Father/Mother; P: Partner; CI: Capital Income; F: Fortune; (Number): Income.

Source: Authors' elaboration.

If axis 1 can be labelled a capital *volume* axis, axis 2 is more of a capital *structure* axis, describing an opposition between:

- a) The highest volumes of personal educational capital/spouse's educational capital level vs. high volumes of specific types of inherited social capital (hereafter ISC), in particular ISC related to the field of politics;
- b) Having/not having worked in organisations/NGOs/politics/Trade unions (binary variables);

c) Having/not having worked in Culture (stands in opposition to politics);

d) Between the lowest (all three categories for all three indicator variables) and intermediate economic capital levels (all three categories for all three indicator variables).

Summed up, the axis describes an opposition between cultural capital on the one side and economic, political and field specific types of social capital. This axis is unique for the women in the field of power, but even so, the axis describes a general opposition within this subgroup; the contributions from the categories are balanced, and no single category has a very high contribution to the axis. This axis is unique for the women in the field of power, and describes a general internal opposition between women who have gained their positions mainly through educational success, and who tend to be married with equally highly educated men, making their carrier rather in the cultural field than through interest organisations, NGOs and politics, vs. women who more often have made their way through interest organisations, NGOs and politics, and who tend to have parents who have held high positions in the same fields.

Axis 3, however, is more of a second order axis. The contributions to axis 3 are more skewed than the contributions to axes 1 and 2, and two categories – work experience from culture and work experience from media (“CultYes” and “MediaYes”) – have a total of 23.4% of the contribution to the axis. The axis therefore mainly describes an *internal* opposition between various forms of personal social capital, stemming from work experience:




FIG. 5. Contributions to Axis 3, CSA.

Source: Authors' elaboration.

Experience from culture and media is opposed to experience from trade unions, civil service, research and justice. Furthermore, axis 3 describes:

- a) An opposition between high and low volumes of inherited social capital;
- b) An opposition between intermediate and higher volumes of personal educational capital;
- c) An opposition between being/not being member of a State committee.

But given that the axis is more of a second order axis, we will put less emphasis on it when commenting on the sectorial oppositions internally among the women.

7. Sectorial Oppositions

The sectors' mean category points in factorial plane 1-2 in the space from the CSA are presented in the cloud of individuals in Fig. 6:




FIG. 6. Sectors in Factorial Plane 1-2. CSA.

Source: Authors' elaboration.

Along axis 1, the scaled deviation between having worked in politics or in organizations, and having had a career in civil service, in the police or in justice, or in research, is >1.0 SD [see Le Roux & Rouanet 2010, 71]. Furthermore, along axis 2, the deviation between organizations and business on the positive side of the axis (upper quadrants), and between church, culture and research is >1.0 SD. Along axis 3, the second order axis (not shown), the deviation between Media vs Police, Research and Organization is even larger, and stands at > 1.6 SDs. Among the women, the degree of sectorial polarization is therefore notable. Clearly, “politics as a vocation” and “science [or law] as a vocation,” to paraphrase Weber [1978 (1922)], turn out to be almost mutually excluding careers for the women in the field of power. And women in the media are separated, and in some respects one could even say structurally isolated, from the others. So far the results from CSA thus confirm our analysis of gender inequalities with respect to institutionalized social capital.

However, compared to the distribution in the global space, the sectorial oppositions in factorial plane 1-2 from the CSA display more of a bi-polar than a tri-polar structure, where positions in politics and in organizations are contrasted to positions

in higher civil service, the judicial system and in research. These two poles also constitute two poles of what we might call “poles of internal circulation.” One might have worked in both politics and organizations, or in higher civil service, academia and in the judicial system. But to cross the barrier between these two clusters is far more seldom.

To sum up, when measured by the number of sectors in which an individual has worked, the degree of multipositionality is at about the same level for men and women. But the *composition* of multipositionality, as this can be measured by work experience from specific sectors, differs between the two sexes. In this respect, the social capital assets tend to leave women with fewer options, and thus with a weaker potential for capital conversion, than men. Against this background, how many distinct subgroups of women can we identify within this subspace?

8. Groups of Women: Cluster Analysis

The subgroups within this élite sample have been identified by way of ascending hierarchical cluster (AHC) analysis based on Ward’s minimum variance clustering method [Romesburg 2004]. The basis for the clustering is the individual women’s factor-coordinates on all the dimensions in the CSA. The axes from the CSA are thus defined as variables in the AHC, and the interpretation of the clusters is based on the principles outlined in Denord *et al.* [2011].

We have retained three clusters for interpretation.

Cluster one (n=132) is the largest cluster, with 43.8% of the respondents. Respondents with low volumes of educational and inherited cultural and also inherited social capital are underrepresented, as are women with shorter university level educations. Women with experience from politics and/or organisations are overrepresented. Summed up, cluster 1 is the cluster of politicians, “outsiders” and “newcomers” in the field of power; a cluster of upwardly mobile women with low global capital volumes.

Cluster two (n=105) sums up 34.9% of the female respondents. Unlike cluster 1, respondents with the highest educations, with partners with the highest educations, with no own work experience from politics, but with work experience from research, from justice and from civil service, are all overrepresented. The volume of inherited cultural and inherited social capital is, however, low. This is therefore a cluster of what may be called “Meritocrats;” females in the field of power with the highest volumes of personal cultural capital, measured by their educational level, with low volumes of most other forms of capital. Both the members of cluster #1 and cluster #2 have

upward mobility trajectories, but because of their high volumes of personal cultural capital, members of cluster #2 stand in sharp contrast to the members of cluster #1.

Cluster three (n=64) sums up 21.3% of the respondents. In this cluster, we find an overrepresentation of respondents with the highest volumes of inherited social capital and also the highest volumes of personal social capital, measured by the number of sectors to which a person is connected through regular and formal meetings. Respondents with high levels of inherited cultural capital are also overrepresented, as are women with work experience from NGOs, Culture and from Media. In many ways this is a cluster of “inheritors.” Unlike the members of cluster #1, they have high levels of inherited capital, and unlike the members of cluster #2, their own educational levels are not the highest. Their main asset, the high volumes of inherited social capital, gives recognition in the field and also potential access to resources linked to networks based on their family of origin.

Summed up, these three clusters establish a clear-cut, tri-polar opposition among the women that is far less clear among the men. A nearby conclusion is therefore that the field trajectories that lead to either one of these clusters are more typical among the women than among the men, and that more trajectories and capital accumulation strategies are open to men than women.

9. Conclusion

As we have shown, Norwegians' societal perceptions stand out from the ones of other Europeans in that they hold a far more egalitarian view of their own society, and also differ from those of their Swedish neighbours. But when it comes to the gendered recruitment to elite positions, the differences are seemingly less important. As a recent Danish study indicates [Larsen, Ellersgaard and Bernsen 2015], the Norwegian case is not unique. Whereas both Denmark and Norway might be special cases of Hartmann's [2006 and 2007] more general model of elite recruitment, the recruitment to elite positions is strongly gendered in both countries. Also in Esping-Andersen's [1990] social democratic welfare state-regime, men dominate the elite recruitment to all sectors and to all positions.

But as our analysis also demonstrates, the Norwegian field of power is gendered in more than one way. The main tri-polar structural opposition in the field of power is clearly gendered, as it is the men who overwhelmingly occupy the positions in the economic pole in this opposition. At the same time it is gendered in the sense that the trajectories of women constitute its own tri-polar structure of oppositions within the main structure. And these gendered structural oppositions tend to reproduce

each other: as long as women do not access, or get access to the economic pole, their trajectories will tend to reproduce their internal structural oppositions, and as long as these oppositions are reproduced they will not access the economic pole. The Telenor case illustrates how difficult it may be for women to change this pattern. But it also illustrates how it may be changed – by women.

Acknowledgements

We wish to thank Janne Cecilie Jobansen and Brigitte Le Roux for their participation and guidance when doing the statistical analysis. Some parts of the article draw on Jobansen [2011]. The data have been provided by Statistics Norway and by the Norwegian Social Science Data Archive. These institutions are not responsible for the analyses of the two data sets.

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Women in the Field of Power

Abstract: This article analyzes capital structures among women in the Norwegian field of power, based on data from the Norwegian Power and Democracy Survey on élites. Inspired by Bourdieu's field theoretical approach, and by way of class specific multiple correspondence analysis and ascending hierarchical cluster analysis, we find that three main capital axes separate internally among the women, in contrast to four among the men. Whereas economic capital polarizes strongly internally among men and in the global field of power, this dimension is not a powerful capital dimension internally among the women. With respect to social capital assets, there are no major differences between men and women when it comes to the degree of endogamy, but sectorial differences are found between the women. Finally, three main subgroups of women are identified: "outsiders," "meritocrats" and "inheritors."

Keywords: Field of Power; Women; Bourdieu; Capital; Gender Inequality.

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