Markku Roinila

Leibniz’s vectorial model of rational decision-making and bounded rationality

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Abstract

Leibniz developed a new model for rational decision-making which is suited to complicated decisions, where goods do not rule each other out, but compete with each other. In such cases the deliberator has to consider all of the goods and pick the ones that contribute most to the desired goal which in Leibniz’s system is ultimately the advancement of universal perfection. The inclinations to particular goods can be seen as vectors leading to different directions much like forces in Leibniz’s dynamics. The vectorial model of rational decision-making is related to Leibniz’s work with metaphysical physics and the calculus of variations and is a heuristic tool which helps in finding reasonable combinations – in ideal cases optimums – between competing goods. By applying the model, the decision-maker can map and compare outcomes of combinations of goods in question and practice a kind of pseudo-mechanical arithmetic of reasons. A central feature of the model is the possibility to employ geometrical figures to help the conceptualization. In this paper I present the vectorial model, examine its applications in practical cases from political theory, jurisprudence and ethics Leibniz presented, and compare the model to recent theories of acting under uncertainty, such as bounded rationality and optimizing under constraints.

Keywords

  • Decision-making
  • Models
  • Moral psychology
  • Optimization
  • Calculus of variations
  • Practical rationality
  • Bounded rationality

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