Abstract

In the Dialectic of the Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer accuse Enlightenment reason of being an instrumental reason. This accusation is well-founded and must be taken seriously. However, unlike the Frankfurt School’s «negative dialectic», the solution must be positive and constructive. The Author therefore examines, as case studies, the solutions given by five authors, who in different ways refer to the Enlightenment: J. Habermas, N. Abbagnano, M. Foucault, H. Putnam, B. Williams. They all put forward constructive proposals, but all present critical issues. The conclusion, which is open, is that in order to defend today a theoretical position inspired by the Enlightenment tradition, the concept of reason probably needs to be scaled down: it must renounce its universalist claims and be reduced to a form of communication about individual problems, considered in their specific historical conditioning.