Abstract

In this paper I address one of the most important methodological discussions within the contemporary debates in political philosophy, that is, the relationship between normative inquiry in ideal and non-ideal theory. Ideal theory, as a paradigm of reasoning that abstracts from the actual circumstances of the real-world, has recently been criticised not just as ineffective as action-guiding, but, more worrisomely, as ideological, since idealisations and abstractions make certain forms of systemic injustice and oppression invisible to theoretical analysis. After presenting these critiques to ideal theorization, in the second part of the contribution I defend a proposal for a redefinition of the power relations between ideal and non-ideal theory. Specifically, the ideal stage of the theory, by placing the focus on normative-philosophical arguments engendered from certain relevant idealizations, aims at publicly justifying a general loose framework of shared standards, ideals and principles. By contrast, non-ideal theory deals with the actual political processes and the daily confrontation among citizens, reasonable and unreasonable alike. I conclude that, even though at the non-ideal level the theoretical and practical tools that the theory of justice can employ are different from those available in the ideal stage, it is reasonable to expect, with the support of correct actions by political institutions and representatives, that even nonidealized deliberative processes can appeal to the loose liberal justificatory framework as guidance for normative reasoning.