Abstract

Generics express generalizations in the linguistic form «Ks are F», where K denotes a category or its members and F a property (for instance, «Tigers are striped» or «Women are emotional»). Generics seem to play a key role in fostering the belief that the members of certain categories share properties and dispositions due to a supposed common essence. It has then been argued that generics concerning discriminated social categories are especially insidious because they could favor prejudice on the same. However, it is still debated whether generics lead to essentialize more than quantified generalizations, such as «Most Ks are F». In this paper, we argue that we nonetheless have good reasons to consider generics as more problematic than quantified generalizations: if, on the one hand, there is no conclusive evidence that generics and quantified sentences lead to essentialize to a different extent, on the other hand, generics are particularly difficult to counter. Moreover, the properties predicated in generics are interpreted as widespread even though generics are also accepted based on limited evidence. This asymmetry in the interpretation of generics highlights a distinctive mechanism through which stereotypes can be transmitted and proliferate.