Silver Bronzo

Libero arbitrio e retributività

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Abstract

In the first part of this paper I specified a certain notion of "free will" and argued that it is a conceptual illusion. I tried to explore the relations between free will and our moral practices. I argued, against P.F. Strawson, that the recognition of the illusory character of free will "does" have some consequences upon our moral life. Such a recognition urges us to abandon the retributive conception of punishment. But this does not "obviously" amount to the abandonment of a vital and constitutive aspect of our moral life: someone may actually think that there are distinctive moral reasons for dropping the conception of punishment as retribution.

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