Abstract

The paper aims at outlining the fundamental characters of the Husserlian theory of the eidetic intuition, bearing in mind the perspective of "Logische Untersuchungen" and "Ideen I", aimed at defining the internal structure of acts of the eidetic intuition, as well as the perspective of "Erfahrung" und "Urteil". In such work, the issue related to the formation of ideal-abstract concepts is tackled from the standpoint of their relation to the empirical basis, given that the passage from «static phenomenology» to «genetic phenomenology» had already taken place. Husserl's theory of the formation of «pure concepts» - at whose core lies the notion of eidetic variation - is a remarkable example of phenomenological understanding of idealization processes and shows several implications regarding the phenomenological theory of objects, the correlation between a priori and experience and Husserl's conception of the relationship between thought and language.