Abstract

In this paper I explore the notion of epistemic alienation of agency in cases of self-deception. Contra Bagnoli (2019), I argue that the notion of strategic defence of a certain representation of the self, of which several authors make use to explain why self-deception occurs, should remain central to the idea that the epistemic agent who embarks on self-deception is incurring epistemic alienation of agency. This requires, however, a disambiguation of the notion of strategic defence. The advantage of such disambiguation reverberates onto a perhaps more nuanced explanation of what it takes, regarding the constitution of agency, and the related claims of responsibility, both to enter and exit self-deception. Finally, I briefly explore a peculiar, and recently somehow more publicly visible case of resistance about exiting forms of epistemic alienations in the face of healthy criticisms. Such resistance may involve a claim of responsibility which, unfortunately, is rhetorically void