Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present one aspect of Stanley Cavell’s philosophical style, namely the characteristic way of using examples. This is by no means a secondary or marginal aspect; on the contrary, it is particularly central to understanding Cavell’s conception of philosophy and of morality. After a description of Cavell’s vision of morality, this paper will investigate Cavell’s choice in favor of examples that are able to represent, and make us imagine, a possible (and plausible) ordinary situation. This paper will show the specificity of Cavell’s philosophical style starting from the presentation of Cavell’s critique of the vision of morality and the use of stylized (and sometimes surreal) examples of Charles Leslie Stevenson (1908-1979), analyzed in the third part of The Claim of Reason. Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy (1979).