Gustaf Arrhenius

Population Ethics and Metaethics

Are you already subscribed?
Login to check whether this content is already included on your personal or institutional subscription.


This paper focuses on the relations between population ethics and metaethics. Population ethics gives rise to well-known paradoxes, such as the paradox of mere addition. After presenting a version of this paradox, it is argued that a different way to dismantle it might be by considering it as a way to change our standard view of justification in moral theory. Two possible views are considered: a non-cognitivist approach to justification and to the explanation of inconsistency in morals; Parfit's suggestion that certain paradoxes might be «quarantined» without shaking our confidence in moral theories encapsulating them.


  • Population Ethics
  • Mere Addition Paradox
  • Repugnant Conclusion
  • Non-cognitivism
  • Justification


Article first page

What do you think about the recent suggestion?

Trova nel catalogo di Worldcat