Michele Palmira

Is Rational Disagreement in Philosophy Possible?

  • Abstract

Informations and abstract

Keywords: Rationality; Skepticism; Evidence; Peer Disagreement; Philosophy.

The aim of this paper is to illuminate some epistemic aspects of philosophical disagreement. A form of skepticism about philosophy is analyzed. This skepticism hinges on the idea that widespread and systematic disagreement in philosophy motivates the contention that philosophical beliefs are largely irrational. A consequence of this skeptical argument is that philosophers should resolve their disagreements by suspending judgement. I argue that this form of skepticism rests on a wrongheaded conception of the rationality of philosophical beliefs. Once a more appropriate notion of rationality is put forward, it is possible to avoid skepticism about philosophy and claim that rational disagreement in philosophy is possible.

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