Abstract

In this article, I will introduce a classification of discursive references. This classification wants to be a scalable tool to grasp how a dynamic process of identifying legal correctness works. Advocating for a minimalist notion of referring – which distinguishes expressible and non-expressible discursive references – makes identity of legal correctness a function of the agents’ commitments. There is an internal relationship between sharing a language and converging on whether what is talked about is or is not expressible. Any question as to why a reference is expressible points to a constitutive feature of it: norms, principles, ideas, concepts are expressible; otherwise, they would not be norms, principles, ideas, or concepts. Although we represent and name norms, principles, ideas and concepts, only non-expressible references can be described. The identification of legal correctness and the correctness of such identification are as dynamically interdependent activities as any other practical process. Nevertheless, it is not clear that models of such processes can be descriptions of mere factual dynamicity.