Abstract

This paper critically reads John Dewey’s classic essay Logical Method and Law (1924) and shows how a (somewhat manipulative) reconstruction of its major arguments, has far-reaching (and underexplored) implications for contemporary analytical philosophy of law. The paper identifies two central theses (respectively, a methodological and a political one), which attempt to connect Dewey’s jurisprudential preoccupations, with his broader theoretical ambitions and political goals. Most specifically, the paper proposes an interpretation of Dewey’s “habitsµ and then tests its use for a range of central jurisprudential concepts, like norm (and its conditions of existence and effectivity), social norm, compulsion and commitment. Finally, the paper proposes a political interpretation of Dewey’s experimental conception of legal and judicial reasoning. While the paper doesn’t provide a definitive defense of either one of such theses, it critically discusses several strategies for overcoming their most visible difficulties and for operationalizing their central proposals, while showing their relevance for contemporary analytical philosophy of law