Abstract

The paper on the topic of "The Specificity and Plurality of Virtue Ethics" explores the central role of "Virtue Ethics" in contemporary moral philosophy, with a particular focus on its roots, its main approaches (aristotelian, humean, nietszchean etc.) and the challenges that this view has to face (e.g. charges with egoism, situationism, contextualism, elitarism etc.). The author argues that the Neoaristotelian perspective endorsed, among others, by Rosalynd Hursthouse, Julia Annas, and Daniel C. Russell is more coherent than other approaches within Virtue Ethics and better suited for meeting those challenges. The argument supporting this thesis grounds in four main elements that the Neoaristotelian Virtue Ethics, unlike other approaches, endorses: (i) the balanced concept of human nature; (ii) the harmonious relationship between reason and emotions, (iii) the main role of practical reason (phronesis) and (iv) the role of education in character building.