Abstract

Psychological and philosophical literature on impasse and doubt are full of assumptions regarding the unpleasantness and quick temporality of these states. These assumptions live on unquestioned thanks to a generally accepted focus on the importance of the solving part of problem-solving dynamics. In this paper we aim at introducing a perspective change that aims to reveal the inconsistency of philosophical and psychological theories with regards to the epistemic and emotional nuances of impasse and doubt. The paper is divided into five main parts: after a brief introduction on the over- and under-studied parts of problem solving, in the second section we will present and briefly discuss the psychological and philosophical theories on impasse and doubt. In the third section, we will explain some inconsistencies between these theories by referring to the lack of attention paid to two situated and crucial variables of problem-solving contexts: time and relative expertise. Then, in the fourth section, we will discuss how discussing particular scenarios, in which agents have high expertise in a field and are not too time pressured, can dramatically change our definition of impasse and doubt. Finally, the fifth section will conclude the paper; in this section we will propose ways to advance the study of these interesting cognitive phenomena, especially focusing on what the still needed empirical research should aim at explaining and describing. In order to depict a feasible line of research, we will comment on recent studies we are conducting on the phenomenology of impasse and doubt – what we call the “feeling of being stuckµ – and we will propose ways to reduce the knowledge gaps on these cognitive phenomena.