Prezzi predatori, industrie a rete e test legali nella teoria e nella prassi delle commissioni antitrust
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Abstract
This paper analyses the tests used by Antitrust Agency in Europe and United States, as the Areeda-Turner and Joskow-Klevorick rules, to assess a predatory pricing behaviour. We show that in utililities industries, in industries with network externalities, and in industries with products that are strongly complementary is not possible to prove a predatory pricing behaviour looking only the relationship between prices and the average and marginal costs. We need, as well, know the parameters of the demand curve of the interrelated markets. Therefore the conclusion of our paper is that the usual tests, as the Areeda-Turner and Joskow-Klevorick ones, could not be used as "per se rules" and that to prove predatory pricing in most cases we need an estimation of parameters of demand curves and documents that show the predatory intent.