Abstract

The article examines the discontinuous support the Energy Regulator and the Italian Government gave to the public incentives to develop new capacity for regassification of Lng. After an initial aid aimed to attract private investments on new Lng terminals even in excess of the foreseeable demand by reducing the financial risk of underutilization of the new capacity, both the Regulator and the Government changed their mind, considering the cost of the public incentives not anymore justified in a forwardlooking uncertain scenario for the gas market. As soon as gas import from Russia had to be reduced due to the Russia-Ukraine crisis, Italy considered again the important contribution that a higher percentage of regassification capacity could have given for the diversification of the supply sources and for reducing the vulnerability of the national gas system, but the lack of available Lng terminals and the higher public aid decided to have in operation the first additional two terminals in few months are consequences of such short-sighted change of mind.