Abstract

Through a new «law and finance» approach (they teach International Law and Financial Mathematics-Risk Management, respectively), the Authors analyse the guarantees issued by the Member States of the Euro Area to the Esm fund in the framework of the European model of financial assistance to Member States. The A. point out the uncertainties of an evaluation of state guarantees due to technical and legal variables. As for the former, such guarantees are quite peculiar, i) because both parties are exposed to counterparty default risk and the risk of the guarantor could be higher than the one of the borrower, and ii) because of the structure of dependence that might exists between the two risks. The A. compare numerical results on the value of a defaultable and correlated guarantee contract, for different values of the default intensities and using two different models, finding relevant differences and counter-intuitive dependence on the attainable correlation. As the level of default risk cannot provide for satisfactory diagnoses, it is hard to evaluate the state guarantees to the Esm, the level of dependence being an element of systemic nature, not directly observable. As for the legal variables, the aim of the financial aid on one side (a full fulfilment), and the lack of tools for sanctioning properly a possible non-fulfilment by the beneficiary on the other side, add further uncertainty. The A. deem crucial for facing such evaluation uncertainty the Ecb role of guarantor of last resort: the credibility of the whole European financial assistance model lies both on the number and range of tools available to the Ecb, and on the potentially unlimited use of some of them (Omt). Should the unlimited use of the Omt be questioned in the near future, negative effects on the state guarantees to the Esm and on the Esm operation would be hardly quantifiable.