Sergio Di Nola Massimiliano Vatiero

Political Origin and Evolution of Corporate Governance

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Abstract

The «species» of corporate governance are the result of an adaptive evolution to the political environment. Contrary to what Legal Origin Theory advances (i.e., a convergence towards to an efficient model), we affirm that the diversity of corporate governance regimes depends on different political institutions which dominate economic contexts. This work, moreover, offers a reassessment with such biological lens of the recent Italian debate on the governance of cooperative banks and mutual organizations.

Keywords

  • Corporate Governance
  • Legal Origin Theory
  • Path-Dependence
  • Italian Cooperative Banks
  • Politics

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