Abstract

The meaning of the doctrine of Montesquieu, in the "politique" or "antiséparatiste" interpretation, which marked the twentieth century also in Italy, consists of two basic rules: the first (negative) places a ban on accumulating multiple functions on top of the same authority, the second (positive) pertains to the concrete mode of division of powers. In the present study the centrality of the legislative power established by the "Président" is examined in the light of the current context, characterized by the opposite trend towards the strengthening of governments to the detriment of parliaments, by the predominance of the executive bodies in the legislative initiative and by the abuse of decree-laws. The result is a kind of "betrayal" of Montesquieu's thought in two respects: the reversal of the centrality of the legislative and the tendency towards the unification of legislative-executive functions along the axis defined by government and parliamentary majority. The result is a sharp devaluation of minorities and of socio-political pluralism.