Claudio Luzzati

How to go Beyond the Dichotomy between Rules and Principles with the Help of Pragmatics

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show how the well-known distinction between rules and principles, seen as two kinds of norms, is inadequate. A principle, far from depending on meaning contents, depends only on the actual use of norms in legal argumentation. The very same norms can be used either as principles or as fact qualifications. In a nutshell, instead of accounting for two kinds of norm, we have to account for two completely different styles of legal argumentation.

Keywords

  • Principles
  • Rules
  • Inclusive Arguments
  • Exclusionary Arguments

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