Abstract

A conventional formula has it that direct dealing on the part of an administrative judge with technical and scientific controversies basically ought to be excluded in the jurisdiction of legitimacy: it is up to the administration to take a position with respect to such controversies, while the judge must limit his action to verifying whether the conclusion reached by the administration is logical, consistent and well-founded, without being able to enter in to the matter of whether the same are correct and to be subscribed. In recent years this general formula has been subject to criticism and rethinking by jurisprudence itself. The key to a reading of administrative jurisprudence cannot be a general formula (as is instead the case with the theory of the power of technical discretion), much less the assumption of a basic indifference on the part of the judge to technical/scientific controversies. In conclusion, in the case of technical/scientific controversy, it is reasonable that the judge not interfere with the conduct of the administration only if the same has adopted one of the 'equivalent' definitive solutions.