Abstract

The essay analyzes the financial consequences of the decisions of the Italian Constitutional Court. The subject is particularly relevant after the constitutionalization of the balanced budget, which came as a consequence of the recent economic and financial crisis and the European policies adopted to deal with it. Through an analysis of the case law of the Italian Constitutional Court, doctrinal contributions, and comparisons with other constitutional systems, the author aims to demonstrate that the balanced-budget rule is acquiring a binding force, thus producing a direct impact on the decisions of Constitutional judges. This implies that fundamental rights cannot be protected without considering the politico-financial objectives of the State. The balanced budget is not indeed only an economic- accounting rule: it relates to values and rights that can enter the balancing process and thus limit the subjective claims brought before the Constitutional Court. Despite the special nature of constitutional decisions, the process of balancing values worth of equal protection can justify, in particular cases, the use of wide margins of normative manipulation by the Constitutional Court.