Abstract

In this essay, the author examines government formation in parliamentary regimes and, in particular, the designation and appointment of the Premier in the post-World War II constitutions of France (Fourth Republic), Germany and Spain. These constitutions provided first for the investiture of the Premier by Parliament and, then, his appointment by the Head of State. The Italian Constitution established a different way of forming the government, providing for the direct appointment of the Prime Minister by the President of the Republic. In fact, for a long time, at least until the early 1990s of the last century, Italian political parties considered themselves the only decisive actors in choosing the Premier and the governmental team. In the early 1990s, however, with the deconstruction of the party system, the influence of the Head of State in the formation of the government greatly increased, giving rise to some “presidential matrix governmentsµ (governi di matrice presidenziale). In this essay, the author reflects on the nature of these governments, noting that in parliamentary regimes, beginning with the experiences of Germany and Spain, the phenomenon of so-called “technical governmentsµ of presidential matrix is rather marginal.