Abstract

It would be extremely reductive to define the ethical framework of the Montaigne’s Essais as a sort of apologia des anciens. The disintegration of subjectivity is not recomposed in the constraints of the 􀊌􀈩􀈜􀈚􀈢, but it becomes the bearer of multiple moral reflections involved in both the religious debate and the growing scientific movement. The individualistic profile of modern ethics remains quite another thing. The union of soul and body is certainly a crucial part of his skeptical philosophy which pushes to extreme consequences. If the soul dies with the body, the whole structure of rewards and punishments falls. Always in harmony with the Aristotle of Padua, the good assumes value in itself, as an objective and not as a means to a further and transcendental goal. The ethics of principles precipitates and crashes onto the materialism of the Essais. A decisive impact was also the result of an alternative conception of aristotelianism, heretics and reformed: atomism. And yet, ethically, it should be questioned how much Montaigne really wanted to follow the atomistic model of Epicurus and Lucretius.