Abstract

The paper shows that conspiracy theories in the strict sense do not represent a form of critique ’from below’ or potential counter-information but instead result in an epistemic rupture with respect to both shared beliefs coming from ’below’ and scientific and academic knowledge coming from ’above.’ The conspiracy theorist presents himself as a solitary hero, who then solitary in fact is not, and as the repository of absolute Truth. Within the framework of the possibilities opened up by the digital revolution, this rupture radicalizes the process of fragmentation of public spheres. In short, given the current discussion of the forms of social criticism as a theoretical background, the conspiracy theorist turns out to place himself on a plane of superiority, as if he were a new critic of ideology. In a second passage, it is shown that conspiracy theories differ from investigative journalism and grounded counterinformation because they do not follow a hypothetical, circumstantial, investigative research model, that is, such that they proceed by means of ‘conspiracy hypotheses’. On the contrary, conspiracy theories are ’sealed’ against any possible counter-argument or evidence that falsifies them: they adopt a peculiar form of infalsifiability and degenerate hermetic semiosis. Such an approach leads to a phantasmatic critique of orders and power relations that is highly detrimental to the epistemic preconditions of open public discussion. Some conspiracy theories can also be used by political leaders and movements, who work to reduce epistemic detachment with other social actors, so as to turn them into mass ideologies, following the classic pattern of political uses of the historical falsity The Protocols of the Sages of Zion. These uses pave the way for persecutory politics, easily combining with populist and antidemocratic rhetoric and movements, thus confirming the need for an effective and radical debunking of such narratives.