Abstract

This paper investigates the intrinsic relationship between life, power, and critique of power. It considers the key-role played by the concept of human life in critical theory, as a qualitative tool for the critique of oppressive social contexts, and questions the severance instituted by Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition between an inter-objective and an inter-subjective approach to human life. Firstly, I show that according to the concept of life adopted a certain conception of power and a certain diagnostic capacity of the critique of power follow, and that the separation between an inter-objective and an inter-subjective approach to the concept of life results in mutual critical inefficiencies. Secondly, I support the importance of bringing the concept of nature back to the centre of an intersubjective conception of human life, while keeping in mind the contemporary risks and requirements of such a concept. To this end, I finally argue that the naturalistic and intersubjective concept of human life outlined by John Dewey can be a point of departure to overcome the severance between nature and recognition, disclosing important perspectives for the critical analysis of the “livesµ of power.