Abstract

This paper addresses some questions that the current scenario of global aging poses to law: are we all vulnerable when we age? Is old age still a contingency? What criteria are used to make judicial decisions that affect the rights of older persons? Do these approaches comply with the current gerontological perspective and with current human rights standards for this group. The possible answers raise four main axes of work that are developed in this text. 1) The meanings of the term vulnerability, its legal origins, and its scope in the field of economic, social, and cultural rights. 2) The concepts of old age and vulnerability that judges have been using when making decisions that affect the rights of older persons since the beginning of the Argentine State (1853). 3) The systematization of the complex approach of current gerontology and human rights standards on this stage of life to compare it with the judicial practices mentioned. 4) On this basis, intersectional criteria are finally postulated that may be useful to establish judicial decisions regarding the position of vulnerability of the elderly in question. For this, the differential and intersectional approach of the Elder Law is taken into consideration