Universality, Realism, and Rights. On Some Feminist Contributions to Legal Philosophy
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Abstract
The aim of the article is to emphasize some methods and approaches proposed by Catharine A. MacKinnon as possible contributions to legal philosophy and social sciences in general. They concern the question of "what counts as human?" in human rights; the notion of universality; the epistemological status of conceptual categories; the relationship between theory and reality. The awareness of narrative and normative role of conceptual categories can moderate the weight of analytical approaches to legal philosophy. Considering that feminist thought holds the priority of interpretative categories on facts - as long as interpretation is necessary in order to understand the concept of sexual harassment or gender violence - MacKinnon's criticisms against postmodernism can offer a good equilibrium between theory and reality.
Keywords
- Thought
- Human Rights
- Epistemology of Social and Legal Sciences