Abstract

According to Shelly Kagan, we have reason to doubt that distributive equality has any value independently of the value of desert. Distributive equality has value whenever people are equally deserving, but in such cases all the normative work is done by desert. And when people are unequally deserving, we should give them what they deserve rather than realizing an undeserved equality. The authors challenge this view of the relation between desert and equality by clarifying the distinct role played by basic equality in grounding the value of distributive equality. Desert is grounded in individuals’ possession of certain features (the ‘desert base’); similarly, the justice of distributive equality is grounded in ‘basic equality’ – that is, individuals’ equal possession of certain entitlement- grounding features. Drawing on their previous work on basic equality, the authors argue that this equality of entitlement-grounding features is not a mere instance of the ‘desert base’, and that equality therefore has independent value. The authors integrate this argument with some relevant distinctions between different conceptions of desert and different conceptions of distributive equality, and then revisit Kagan’s argument in order to expose some conceptual confusions about the relation between desert and equality. These include the supposed primacy of desert over equality, and some illusory conflicts between the two values.