Abstract

The question of the limit is part of the critical discourse of the philosopher E. Husserl (1859-1938) towards the excessive rationalization operated by the sciences starting from modernity. Modern science, as a science in Galilean and Cartesian terms, according to Husserl, would have made the mistake of having led to an increase in knowledge in terms of mathematization and geometrization of the world. To this growth, however, corresponded in a directly proportional way the loss of the sense of knowledge itself, towards the existence and ethical action of man. With respect to the accuracy of geometry and mathematics, Husserl opposes the inaccuracy of phenomenology which, although it is a rigorous science with respect to the essence of things, recognizes that absolute determination and accuracy are not predictable of the real, which considers the particular singularities always perfectible. Unlike the universal subsumptions of the mathematization of the real, whose purpose is a perfect practical domain of the world, what is real and natural in the phenomenological sense, is expressed rather according to concepts that are essentially inaccurate. It is, therefore, evident that for Husserl the question of the limit, as a properly phenomenological question, is played authentically in the dialectic of an invariance (of the essence) that is given in the variation of the real itself, characterized by ontologically independent eidetic singularities. The reconstruction of the question of the limit, not systematically structured by Husserl, has been interpreted as a morphological question, in which the essences are inaccurate, flowing and therefore structurally non-mathematizable.