Business Interests and Fiscal Policy in Fascist Italy: The Role of Confindustria and Assonime
Are you already subscribed?
Login to check
whether this content is already included on your personal or institutional subscription.
Abstract
The paper provides a contribution to the debate over business power, considering the agency of business associations on the shaping of corporate tax policies in fascist Italy. The analysis focuses on the role played by the Association of Italian Joint-Stock Companies (Assonime) and the Confederation of Industry (Confindustria). The interactions between business interests and fascism are categorized according to a three-level articulation, highlighting the interaction between technicians from both business associations and institutions. The first aim is to verify the effectiveness of this interaction in prompting business interests to reduce fiscal burden on companies. The second is to highlight not only the political but also the economic role of business associations, verifying their effectiveness in reducing uncertainty arising from the changing political, regulatory and economic environment. The analysis of two case studies permits an initial assessment of business power with respect to different tax policies carried out by the fascist regime: the so called «liberal phase» (1922-25) and the «dirigiste phase» (1935-39).
Keywords
- Fascism
- Business power
- Business associations
- Lobbying
- Corporate tax policies