Abstract

This article examines the phenomenon of employer power, with a specific focus on the effects of labour market concentration on workers’ welfare. After briefly presenting and discussing the theoretical model of monopsony, the article analyses the methodologies most commonly used for measuring the level of market concentration. Then, it discusses the most recent and relevant empirical studies on the topic, which show that most labour markets are exposed to moderate or high levels of concentration and that this condition can lead to lower wages and worse working conditions for workers, both in the USA and in Europe. The article then analyses the role that antitrust can have in counteracting the negative effects of labour market concentration, exploring the possibility of including the labour market dimension into the analyses of mergers and acquisitions carried out by the relevant agencies, and, if they result in significant harm to workers, of blocking them. Overall, this article provides an overview of the empirical evidence and feasible antitrust solutions to the problem of employer power in the US and European labour markets.