Alistair M.C. Isaac

Embodied Cognition as Analog Computation

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Abstract

Embodied, enactive cognitive science has traditionally rejected computationalism and its compatriot, representationalism. I argue that this rejection is too hasty, and places undo weight on intuitions about simple dynamical systems, such as the Watt Governor. I suggest instead that enactivists should consider cognition analogous to more complex, functional dynamical systems, such as analog computers, offering in particular a hydrodynamic computer, the MONIAC, as a new metaphor for embodied cognitive science. The implication of this approach is that adequate explanations of embodied cognition will require both the construction of models and the identification of representations.

Keywords

  • Embodiment
  • Enactivism
  • Dynamical Systems
  • Analog Computation
  • Representation

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