Abstract

This paper explores the relation among several key theoretical features of McDowell's epistemological disjunctivism. Specifically, it focuses on the relation among the notions of "appearance", "warrant", "perceptual capacity" and "fallibility". The aim of the paper is twofold. On the on hand, we aim to provide a faithful reconstruction of McDowell's disjunctivism, clarifying the relations among some constitutive concepts shaping his views on perceptual experience. On the other hand, our reconstruction ends up with the identification of a possible difficulty concerning McDowell's attempt to accommodate the theoretical ambitions inscribed in his proposal. In the last part of the paper we question the success of McDowell's attempt to reconcile, on the one hand, the structural fallibility of our perceptual capacity, and, on the other hand, the capacity of rational subjects to know, from a first person perspective, that they possess indefeasible warrants for suitably related perceptual-based beliefs.