Abstract

After having introduced in general terms the lines of Midgley’s approach to philosophy and moral philosophy, in this paper I concentrate on the understanding of human nature and on the representation of the moral universe she declines in a number of texts. Particularly, I address the way in which she puts under pressure the appeal to the notion of equality, as a fundamental tool to acknowledge a full moral status to individuals and to define the composition of the moral universe, and suggests in its place the relevance of relationships, ties and bonds as morally crucial. To accomplish this analysis, I discuss the arguments she puts forward with respect to the issue of the relationships between humans and non-human animals and between men and women (being her feminist engagement less known than others). In so doing I do not only expose a crucial issue in Midgley’s work, but connect it to methodological aspects of her work and to different possible interpretations of her overall production, while showing at the same time its value for current discussions both in moral philosophy and in the feminist debate.