Alfredo Paternoster

Seeing Things as They Are? Three Questions on Direct Realism

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Abstract

In this paper, I discuss three questions concerning the alleged coherence between direct realism and other parts of Searle's theory of perception. The outcome of the discussion is that, despite the clarity of his arguments and the commonsensical character of his main theses, Searle has hardly succeeded in justifying his theory, and for a fundamental reason: direct realism is very likely more a constraint on a theory of perception than a substantive theory one can argue for.

Keywords

  • Perception
  • Direct Realism
  • Representationalism
  • Disjunctivism
  • Internalism

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