Matthew Bennett

Giving Myself a Law. Nietzsche, Self-respect, and the Problem with Kant's Universalism

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Abstract

This paper offers a new interpretation of Nietzsche's criticisms of Kant's account of freedom and renders these criticisms in such a way as to pose a serious challenge to Kantian ethics. My first aim is to explain Nietzsche's challenge to the principle that being free means acting as a free agent ought to act, which I call Kant's universalism. My second aim is to show that Kant's accounts of selfrespect is a particularly unconvincing account of how we can make room for Nietzsche, Self-respect, and the Problem with Kant's Universalism 243 virtues within a universalistic framework, and thereby persuade the Kantian that there is something wrong with the underlying universalism principle.

Keywords

  • Nietzsche
  • Kant
  • Meta-ethics
  • Self-respect
  • Self-legislation

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