Abstract

The essay analyses in Durkheim’s work the presence of a movement characteristic of Hegelian ethical life, with reference to the tension that can be found within the Philosophy of Right between the subjective and objective dimensions of freedom. The purpose of the investigation is to show how, for both Hegel and Durkheim, the world of social relations constitutes the necessary place for the emergence of freedom and solidarity and, therefore, of their first actualization through the evolution of right. The essay then argues how, in both authors, the relationship between solidarity and freedom is necessary for the enucleation of a concept of individuality – utterly different from that proposed by modern individualistic rationalism – that finds in the knot of differentiation and bi-univocal relation to objectivity the ratio – graspable and recognizable by the citizen only through the mediation offered by the speculative action of the State – of the full actualization of the subject and their autonomy.