Francesco Iani

Embodied Cognition: Half a revolution?

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Abstract

In the last two decades of the history of cognitive science, there has been a proliferation of research explicitly aligned with what has been termed «Embodied Cognition » theory (EC). Although the facets by which this term is interpreted are diverse, often not convergent, and with implications that are not always clearly testable, the purpose of this article is to highlight the reasons why EC has been and continues to be a revolution. Some experimental results are surprising in some respects and reveal some fundamental problems of cognitive science. At the same time, the second purpose of the article is to highlight the extent to which the advent of EC represents a «half revolution». This term may have a double meaning: 1) the EC, at least in its less controversial meanings, is not so radically different from some previous theories (there are references in relation to which the EC may represent a natural evolution); 2) to date, the EC does not represent an all-encompassing theory of human cognition (there are several areas where the EC loses some of its predictive value and theoretical accuracy).

Keywords

  • Embodied cognition
  • disembodied cognition
  • cognition
  • body

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