Carlo Umiltà

The Neuropsychology of Consciousness

Are you already subscribed?
Login to check whether this content is already included on your personal or institutional subscription.

Abstract

A distinction is introduced between cognitive processes, which never reach consciousness, and results of cognitive processes (representations), which may become conscious. Following brain damage, representations and consciousness may break down. This phenomenon is termed dissociation between preserved implicit (non-conscious) knowledge and impaired explicit (conscious) knowledge. Examples of the implicit/explicit dissociation are provided based on neuropsychological deficits such as cortical blindness, prosopoagnosia, neglect and amnesia. It is argued that there is no unitary area in the brain on which conscious experience depends. It is proposed that the contents of consciousness depend on two factors: a) the activity of certain specific cortical areas, and b) attention. That is, the result of a given cognitive process can reach consciousness only if it occurs with the mediation of attention and involves a cortical area endowed with the "capability of consciousness".

Preview

Article first page

What do you think about the recent suggestion?

Trova nel catalogo di Worldcat