Abstract

The paper is aimed at analysing the relationships between the economic regulation and the political objectives of the liberalization, with particular reference to the mobile telecommunications market. More in details, the idea is that the best way to design a regulatory intervention for the market is that of simultaneously considering the actual objectives set at the political layer - conveniently interpreted in order for them to acquire an operational meaning - the structural characteristics of the industry and the real conducts of the operators. Such an original approach, once applied to the mobile market and in particular to the mobile-mobile termination problem, shows that the current regulatory setting is counter-productive since the termination tariff turns out to be a powerful tool in dominant operators' hands to control the market. In light of the theoretical reconstruction presented, and given the current mobile penetration level in Italy, the essay demonstrates that the best intervention for fostering an effective competition in the market is the introduction of the receiving party pays principle. An alternative, even if less efficient, could be that of implementing a bill and keep arrangement.