Elisabetta Iossa, Biancamaria Raganelli, Federica Marconi

Public Procurement and Bid Rigging: Corruption, Cartels, and Organized Crime in the Decisions of the Italian Supreme Court

  • Abstract

Informations and abstract

Keywords: Procurement; Public contracts; Tenders; Competition

This paper studies the distorting phenomena concerning tender manipulation in the procurement of public contracts (Article 353 of the Italian Criminal Code), starting from the 617 pronouncements of the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional sections between 2016 and 2020. Corruption, cartels, and other conduct such as threats, violence, and false documentation or statements, emerge as the main causes of tender manipulation. The analysis brings to light some distinctive elements of the phenomenon, such as the nature and frequency of the wrongdoing, its geographic distribution, the role of those involved, the characteristics of the tender, the perceived utility in corruption cases, and the way the wrongdoing is reported. The picture that emerges highlights the need to encourage maximum collaboration among the authorities involved, contracting authorities and other procurement agencies, as well as the need to strengthen anti-corruption and competition safeguards in the public contracts awarding procedures

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