Francesco Belvisi

Chance and certainty of law in legal adjudication

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Abstract

The paper deals with the probable existence of what may be called chance, accident, contingency or even arbitrariness especially in determining the meaning of facts and norms that are relevant for the decision of a judicial case. Under a realistic and hermeneutical point of view, Oliver W. Holmes, Max Weber, and Josef Esser have shown that the determination of facts and norms is a matter of selection. But selective decisions are subjective by nature. The theory of legal argumentation, by focusing on the hypothetical conditions of legal certainty, neglects the true role of chance in adjudication.

Keywords

  • Chance
  • Certainty of Law
  • Judicial Decision
  • Fact's Construction
  • Legal Interpretation

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