The U.S. Congressional Budget Office: a model of fiscal council for Europe?
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Abstract
The Eurozone crisis has convinced the European economic governance bodies of the opportunity to require Member States to establish independent fiscal institutions (also known as fiscal councils, or fiscal watchdogs) in order to discourage decisions contrary to the European budgetary constraints and to integrate the checks of the Commission in this matter within their national legal order. With this in view, the essay aims to verify if, given the expectations of European economic governance and the profoundly different institutional framework, one of the most successful experience in the field of fiscal councils, such as the U.S. Congressional Budget office, may nevertheless be applicable within Italy.
Keywords
- Constitutionalism
- Fiscal Council
- Independent Fiscal Institution
- Fiscal Watchdog
- Budgetary Constraints
- Budget Policy
- CBO
- Congressional Budget Office
- EMU
- Separation of Powers
