Abstract

The article retraces in detail the evolution of the political and institutional debate over the future of the economic governance of the European Union with particular reference to the succession of work groups established by the leaders of the institutions of the Union. The picture that emerges therefrom is that of a remarkable fragmentation of the instruments of intervention and, above all, of an appreciable change in the models of action with respect to the classic picture of the inspiring principles of the action of the Community organs. The proliferating of normative instruments outside the legal framework of the Union, in particular, today poses the alternative of the reinsertion of such instruments within the framework of the Treaties or else the continuation of these external agreements. In the first case, the greatest difficulty would be in finding a political agreement over the alteration of the Treaties, while in the second case the principal problem would lie in an appreciable transfer of powers within the Union, above all in favour of independent institutions such as the ECB and Court of Justice and to the detriment in particular of the European Parliament.