Abstract

The present essay criticizes the sentence of the Italian Constitutional Court n. 161 of 2023, which deems that art. 6, co. 3, of law no. 40 of 2004 − containing the prohibition on the revocation of consent given to medically assisted procreation after the formation of the embryo − still expresses, despite the relevant jurisprudential interventions modifying the law, a not unreasonable balance between the various interests involved in the matter: request of the wife to arrange for the transfer of the embryo into the uterus, after she separated from her husband and with his firm opposition. The Court, in fact, to protect the psychophysical health of the woman, considers her self-determination to a solitary motherhood to be paramount compared to that of the man not to become a father because the family plan originally shared with his ex-wife has ceased. This legitimizes, however, the ab initio creation of a family unit without a father, which obliterates the importance of the concept of family as a social formation conducive to a more harmonious development of the minor’s personality, to the extent that it combines autonomy and responsibility of both parental figures