Abstract

The regulations governing the direct election of the mayor in the region of Sicily stipulate that s/he (and therefore his/her period of office) must be institutionally independent of the majority (whatever it may be) in the communal council. After comparing Sicilian with national law, the essay examines the effects of the Sicilian law on the stability of mayorships and city councils in the light of the possibility of consulting the population on dismissal of the mayor (only two dismissals out of the fourteen requested). The essay then examines changes internally to the communal councils of Palermo and Catania, which are characterized by different relationships between the mayor and the majority (accordant in Palermo, discordant in Catania). Finally, a number of hypotheses are formulated concerning the causes of the exceptional instability of the councils of the two cities (in Palermo 22 councillors out of 50 have changed group in three years; in Catania, after little more than three years only 16 councillors out of 60 have not changed group).