Abstract

The paper examines prime ministers' resignations in Italy from 1915 to 1922. The analysis regards their political origins, their forms (resignations following a no-confidence vote or not) and their consequences (new prime minister; formation of a new government under the old prime minister; fresh confidence vote in Parliament). The study is conducted on the basis of two key-concepts: the constitutional requirement of 'double confidence' (from the Crown and Parliament) and the form and content of the 'majority government' (the divided union sacrée during the war and the hybrid alliance between liberal-democrats and catholics after the 1919 election). In this political framework, characterized by an unstable majority government, the Crown acquired more power of action, although such power was always exercised within the boundaries of the constitutional order, both as a 'broker' in conflicts between Chamber and Government or among political forces, and as a 'power' when the Crown itself provoked the resignation of a prime minister still supported by the Parliament, thus enabling Mussolini to seize power.